5.1 Typology of political power systems
Presidential and parliamentary systems are two clean types of power organizational systems. The presidential system – is a system that has the following features: the president is the head of the state and chief executive authority, popularly elected for a fixed term of office, forms and dismisses the government and guides its activities.
The parliamentary system is a system in which, along with the head of the state (the monarch, the president elected by parliament or other body) acts the chief executive authority (prime minister), who is the leader of the majority party in parliament.
The basic difference between presidential and parliamentary systems is the degree of dependence or independence of the executive powers from parliament. Presidential systems have an independent source of democratic legitimacy for the executive and legislative branches, as both branches of power are elected separately. In parliamentary systems, the prime minister depends on the confidence of the majority in parliament. Presidents can be removed from the post due to the lengthy impeachment procedure (not because of the result of conducted policy, but because of serious violations, such as corruption, treason and so on.), while the prime ministers can get a vote of non-confidence in parliament. Presidents cannot dissolve the parliament, and the prime ministers can dissolve parliament and call the new elections.
Thus, parliamentarism is characterized by the coexistence and interdependence of the executive and legislative powers, when no one branch of government cannot dismiss another without dissolution, the government cannot survive without the support of a parliamentary majority. The Presidency, on the contrary, is characterized by independence and separation of powers.
The best option for democracy, according to most of political analysts, is the parliamentary system. Parliamentary government has more chances for assurance democratic consolidation for the following reasons. Firstly, the parliamentary form of government can better represent the various groups, especially when using the mechanisms of proportional election system. Secondly, it is more flexible than the presidential form of government with a fixed term of office. Third, in parliamentary systems, the prime minister need to retain the support of parliament, the absence of which is fraught with the loss of power, and for this reason, parliamentary form of government does not lead to the threat of political immobility due to unseated chief executive authority. Thus, there is a mutual support of executive and legislative powers. Fourth, the system is able to survive in the conditions of a multiparty system. Fifth, it does not allow the executive power to abuse of authority. Sixth, the responsibility of government to parliament provides the flexibility of terms of office. Seventh, the parliamentary form of government provides the professional premiers with experience in party work and a strong intraparty discipline. These benefits protect it from coups.
Premiership of such outstanding personalities like M. Thatcher, S. Berlusconi, G. Schroeder, H. Kohl, and others, led to a new phenomenon – presidentialisation of parliamentary democracy.
This process changes the logic of parliamentarism, which acquires the features of a presidential system (not institutionally, but behaviourally). As a result, the executive power is concentrated in the hands of the prime minister, who receives a certain independence from the parliament. This tendency is manifested, firstly, in reducing the role of the cabinet in policy definition (and, agreeably, in increase the role of unelected experts and Brain Trust), and secondly, in a strong personalization of the parliamentary elections and strengthening the focus on the individual of party leaders, rather than programs. Two factors underlie the presidentialisation process: media with an individual focus on leaders and internationalization of policy, which resulted in many of the decisions taken at the international level, and then are ratified by national parliaments. Presidentialisation of parliamentarism is typical only for majoritarian parliamentary democracies, having a one-party government or a government with the dominant party, so, the change of the format of party and electoral system can limit this tendency.
5.2 Threats to presidential power systems
The basic difference between presidential and parliamentary systems lies in the degree of dependence or independence from the executive branch of Parliament, therefore, parliamentarism is characterized by cooperation and consensus, and the presidency by confrontation, antagonism and constant conflicts between the branches of government. Therefore, many believe that the presidential system is hard compatible with the practice of democratic governance.
Critics of the presidency identify following “threats to presidency” for democracy.
Firstly, dual legitimacy inhering in the institution of the presidency as the president and parliament are elected popularly. Defenders of the presidency believe that there are two independent and legitimate factors with clearly defined powers the main advantage of presidency, as such separation of powers protects from tyranny by the minority or the majority. It is worth noting that with the problem of the double legitimacy may face some bicameral parliamentary systems, but in this case the conflict is resolved by a new election, which is impossible in the presidency because of the independent existence of two powers.
Secondly, the presidency by nature is majoritarian and does not provide an adequate representation of minorities, but it is a consequence of the choice of disproportionate electoral system. The use of the plural system “winner-take-all” in parliamentarism leads to the fact that majority will simultaneously control two branches of government. In presidential systems the power of winner extends only to the executive branch.
Thirdly, the fixed terms of office of presidency and the parliament, the lack of vote of non-confidence to the government and the right to dissolve the parliament made crises between two branches of government insoluble and create mutual-blocking situation among, many of which were resolved by unconstitutional way with revolutions and auto-revolutions. The only mechanism to overcome the problem of fixed terms is impeachment, so many new democracies have tried to use it to eliminate the Presidents, not infracted the constitution, but not having the support of the parliamentary majority, which also violated the basic principles of democracy. Fixed terms may be considered as a guarantee of the stability of the executive branch, however, if the constitution does not provide for the extension of the presidential term, the competent president may lose the power. Empirical studies show that limiting the terms of office of presidents provides a change of leaders and parties and increases chances for opposition candidates, as the participation of the current president in the election, the opposition has virtually no chances, while participation of a successor, the chances of the opposition and the authorities are near equal.
More than 90 presidential and semi-presidential countries of the third wave of democratization are faced with the problem of reelection during a limited time. As a result, 26 presidents have overcome the constitutional limits: 14 countries (13 and 1 semi-presidential) removed all term limits, 12 presidents ensured their reelection, while saving limitations. Currently, the terms of presidency limits exist in all democracies (For 50 years from 1958 to 2008 France was the only exception, in USA the president can be reelected for a second term (although the restriction was introduced only in 1951 as a 22-th amendments only after F. D. Roosevelt four times won the election in the period of 1932–1944 years).
Fourth, the presidential system encourage coming to power not only popular politicians, but also famous personalities, and outsiders not having populist political experience. On the one hand, the personification of election enhances the processes of deinstitutionalization and hinders the development of the party systems and democracy, and on the other – clearly defines the responsibility for the policy of the government, the budget of the country and its implementation. A comparative study of participants of the Latin American president and European parliamentary elections who got more than 10 % of votes demonstrates the superior part in the presidential election of former presidents, new to politics and even family members of the former president.
Fifth, the institution of the presidency offers the presidents the opportunities to exceed their powers and change the style of presidential politics. Presidents (often populist) feel their personal responsibility to the people, therefore, solve the problem of dual democratic legitimacy for their own benefit and start to abuse the power and exceed the allowed authority.
So, all “threats” to presidency come down to a lack of cooperation between the President and the Parliament and mutual blocking, for solving this the president, often populist, with a public mandate, bearing personal responsibility for the policy of the government and not relying on next term under the constitution, starts to use the legislative powers, introduces changes in the terms and transforms into elected dictator. Mostly, threats to presidency strengthen under the multiparty system. Hidden threats to presidency led to the disintegration of the presidential democracy.
The pattern of disintegration of the multiparty presidential democracy comes from the fact that the main feature of presidency – is the separation of powers – prevents the party discipline and coalitions, and multi-party system leads to the government of minority, the situation of mutual blocking, inefficiencies and ultimately to the disintegration of democracy through a revolution or strengthening the executive powers of the president.
5.3 Power systems and democracy: the condition of the discussion
After criticism of the presidential system in 1990, the focus of comparative studies in the new institutionalism was in the link between institutional design and the stability of democracy. The presidency or parliamentary system were considered as an independent variable, as a dependent - the duration of the existence of democracy or its disintegration. Quantitative research of democratic regimes survival of Meynuoring S., Shugart M., Stepan A., Skach S., Cheybub H., Limonzhi F. confirmed the hypothesis of Linz H. and showed that the parliamentary systems are more stable than presidential and less prone to disintegrations.
In the research of S. Meynuoring consolidated democracy has existed without interruption only in 25 countries, 18 of which had parliamentary system. Analyzing the survival of democracies, M. Shugart and J. Carey has shown that in the twentieth century. disintegrated more parliamentary democracies (12 presidential, 6 semi- presidential and 21 parliamentary), but the proportion of falls among presidential regimes was higher than parliamentary: disintegrated 50 % of all presidential democracies, and only 43.8 % of parliamentary, twice before had time to hold democratic elections.
In the sample of countries of A. Stepan and S. Skach among the 93 countries that became independent after 1945, none of the presidential democratic regimes did not last after 1980. Most of these countries moved towards authoritarianism in the 1980s, and 15 countries saved democracy had a parliamentary system.
Cheybub H. and A. Przeworski determined the average lifetime of a president (24 years) and parliamentary (74 years) regimes. However, the results of all studies were dependent on the selected time frame of research (disintegrations of the first or second wave of democratization) and the choice of the incidents: for example, among the 15 consolidated democracies of Stepan and Skach were Nauru, Bahamas, Kiribati and other micro-states and 14 of the 15 successful countries had British colonial legacy a favorable condition for democracy.
Presidential system appeared in Latin America and Africa, where initially there were no structural preconditions for democracy and parliamentary systems in Europe and the former British colonies, having the best potential for the development of democracy. In M. Shugart and S. Meynuoring works in 24 of 31 developed countries had a parliamentary system. H. Cheybub found that after the military regime presidential regimes have been established in 3.5 times more likely (31 of 51), and the survival of democracy after the military dictatorship is significantly less than after the civil, so the instability of presidential regimes may be associated not with the presidency but with the army.
When political scientists have begun to take into account socio-economic factors, conclusions about the superiority of parliamentarism have become less convincing. Shugart and Carey, showing in their sampling only third world countries, concluded that the proportion of parliamentary regimes falls is higher than presidential. The phenomenon of the presidential system is inherent generally to the third world, and the majority of failed presidential regimes return to democracy, while among parliamentary countries of the third world, only Turkey returned to democracy after the collapse. They concluded that in the third world, the proportion of parliamentary regimes falls is higher, and that the falls of the parliamentary regimes in the third world are less reversible than the falls of presidential regimes.
Indeed, parliamentary countries are differ by a great level of GDP per capita, lower unemployment level, and, as is well known, “the prosperous state has more chances to save democracy” (hypothesis of S.M. Lipset). In these countries there are less number of protest actions (strikes, civil disorders, assassinations), which is often associated with the collegiate executive power. On the other hand, parliamentarism is more common in the countries with favorable structural conditions for the stable democratic, more developed, not big, as well as in European countries. Among the countries with a population of less than 1 million people, there are 15 presidential and 71 parliamentary. H. Cheybub and F. Limonzhi showed that with a low level of economic development, the type of regime does not affect the survival of democracy: each eight democracy of any type crashes, and with a high level parliamentary regimes show better survival outcomes.
According to A. Lijphart, two basic alternatives, before which are the creators of new democratic constitutions – it is a choice, firstly, between the electoral systems, based respectively on the majority principle and the principle of proportional election system, and, secondly, between the parliamentary and presidential forms of government. Most clearly expressed examples of the combination of the presidential form with the majority principle give the United States, as well as democracies, which experienced a strong impact of the United States the Philippines, South Korea. Latin American countries have adopted the system, combining with the presidential form with proportional election system. Parliamentary majoritarian systems exist in the United Kingdom and many former British colonies, including India, Malaysia, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (up to referendums of 1992–1993). Systems that combine parliamentary form of government with proportional election system are concentrated in continental Western Europe.
According to A. Lijphart, in the context of representation and protection of minority rights, the degree of democratism, preservation of public peace and order, as well as the management of the economy parliamentary system based on proportional election system, show the best results. In a study of A. Lijphart parliamentary-proportional systems promote the greater political participation in elections (84.5 % versus 54.2 % in the presidential – majoritarian and 75 % – in the parliamentary- majoritarian), the better representation of women (16.4 % vs. 4 % in presidential and parliamentary-majoritarian), and more efficient policy (the inflation rate and the unemployment rate was lower than in parliamentary and proportional than in the parliamentary-majoritarian). A. Lijphart concluded that “for new democracies and democratizing countries a combination of a parliamentary form of government with proportional election system should be particularly attractive.”
5.4 Semi-presidential systems
Most of the researchers with that the optimum system for the new democracies is parliamentarism. However, very often the new democracies need personified power in the face of a popularly elected head of state, so they opt for a semi- presidential system. Over fifty new political regimes in Africa, Asia and the post-communist space have chosen semi- presidential institutional design, so at the end of the 1990s, semi-presidentialism was in the center research of neo-institutionalists. The term “semi-presidential system” was proposed in 1980 by Maurice Duverger and included a system with three characteristics: the national elections of the President, considerable powers of the president and the dependence of government on the confidence of the parliamentary majority. The term and its characteristics, data of Duverger, have been criticized more than once. First, some authors believe that the semi-presidential systems are the hybrids rather than pure types (M. Shugart). Second, the general elections in some semi-presidential countries of formal and carried out by agreement between the parties. Third, Duverger list included the presidents who do not have “considerable” authority (Ireland, Iceland, Austria), so some politicians proposed to exclude presidential powers from the definition (R. Elgie, D. Sartori and J. Blondel) and consider dual responsibility of executive power as the main semi-presidentialism feature.
As J. Blondel noted, “neither the parliamentary nor the presidency cannot solve the problems of the country, seeking to create a pluralistic system, and having a weak party system.” Dual leadership system, on the contrary, may provide a combination of autonomy and flexibility and create the conditions for a stable liberal regime ... This system does not protect against mistakes, but gives an independent space to the president and a means of pressure on the parliament, for example, dissolution, and participation in government. Semi- presidential systems had to overcome two possible problems of the presidency: mutual blocking of the legislative and executive power, because of their separation and transition to the dictatorship of the president. In presidential systems, the first problem is often solved by creating a strong presidency, which caused the second problem.
Charles de Gaulle in 1946 explained the logic of this system in the following way: “The executive power cannot come from the parliament, which is the legislative power, without the threat of powers mixing, with which the government will be a meeting of parliamentary parties... The executive power must come from the head of state, who is above the parties and an elected body, which includes the parliament, but it is much larger than the parliament ... He is the arbiter of political accidents ...”. Modern research shows that when the presidents are “above parties”, they find themselves in a “strategic disadvantage in mobilizing of support for their policies.” Nonparty presidency may negatively affect the development of the party system, necessary for democracy: if the president stands above parties, 50 % of the members of semi- presidential government do not have party identification, compared with 9 % for the party president.
Semi- presidency is less subjected to crises between the branches of government than presidency, as the main condition is the government support of a majority in parliament.
Prime-presidential system has the following distinctive features: national election of the president (head of state); functions of executive power are performed by the prime minister and cabinet responsible to parliament.
Presidential-parliamentary system is characterized by the following features: national election of the president (head of state), who has the right to appoint and dismiss members of the government; while the government is responsible to parliament.
So, in the semi-presidential systems, in contrast to the presidential and parliamentary, different institutions can appoint and dismiss the government. In presidential systems it always does the president, in parliamentary system – the parliament. In prime presidential systems the president may appoint, but not to displace the government (institutional approach), but to influence the government, the president should be the leader of the party that has the majority seats in parliament (behavioral approach). In the presidential-parliamentary systems the president can appoint and displace members of the government, which approximates this system to a presidential, but the system will be semi- presidential, as the parliament has the right to express a vote of no confidence to the government against the wish of the president. It is worth noting that the right to dissolution of Parliament be the President is not a key feature of semi-presidential systems, though many semi- presidential give this right to the presidents. According to M. Shugart, “the right to dissolve the parliament does not make the system more presidential, as, by definition, the presidential systems mean the separation of the origins and survival of the president and the parliament ... The dissolution gives the president the right to restraint the parliament and political parties in the parliament”. In accordance to this logic, entitlement the president the right to dissolve the parliament, which cannot influence the government, it would violate the principle of checks and balances, so in the presidential systems presidents do not have this right.
According to R. Eldzhi, structural factors have a great influence on the model of the distribution of power between the president and prime minister in the semi-presidential systems. In Austria, Ireland and Iceland, there is a model with ceremonial president. In Austria semi-presidential model was introduced in 1929 (after the parliamentary model, in which the head of state played a symbolic role), so this model during the second wave of democratization has been restored. In Ireland and Iceland nationally elected heads of state were to symbolize the great democratism and legitimacy in comparison with the colonial past (the monarchy in the UK and Denmark). In Bulgaria and Slovenia, semi-presidential design is the result of the desire to increase the legitimacy and symbolize a break with the past in the course of democratization, so a model with a weak, though nationally elected president to avoid throwback to authoritarianism, was chosen. In France, the change in the constitution of 1962, which led to the nationally election of President de Gaulle, has increased the legitimacy of the incumbent president and his successors, and confirmed the presidential model of semi-presidentialism.
The main criticism of semi-presidentialism is as follows: firstly, the big powers of the presidents, leading to presidentialisation and dictatorship; secondly, the possible coexistence of president and prime minister from different parties, provoking their mutual-blocking; thirdly, divided minority of government, violating stability of the system.
Many authors follow Shugart and Carey, and by studying the powers of presidents in semi-presidential systems, come to the conclusion that strong presidents are not suited for democracy in the semi-presidential systems. Roper, who has studied the legislative and non-legislative powers of presidents, considers that, prime-presidential regimes with large presidential powers lead to greater instability of governments, which may break the integrity of the political system.
The coexistence of the president and prime minister from different parties and divided government – is not the result of the work of institutions (institutional approach), but the result of the presidential and parliamentary elections (behavioral approach). Therefore, many researchers practice the alternatives in the balance of forces in the semi-presidential systems. If the presidential systems may have only two options (president of the minority or the president of the majority), in the semi-presidentialism there are three options: 1) consolidated majority (president, prime minister and the parliamentary majority belong to the same party); 2) divided majority, or coexistence (only the prime minister is supported by a majority in parliament); 3) divided minority (neither the president nor the prime minister have the support of the majority).
The situation of consolidated majority has the lowest conflict potential and, accordingly, the risk of exceeding the president powers, so it is the optimal from the point of view of democracy. This situation occurs if the president and the parliamentary majority are on the same side of the ideological and political spectrum or the president is the leader of his party. The coexistence situation may lead to the use of emergency or the legislative powers by the president, especially at low-opposition parliament. Divided government of minority in the semi-presidentialism combines features of divided government in the presidency and a minority government in parliamentarism, so this situation is most problematic for democracy, because it leads to shift of coalitions, governments and excess of president power. Therefore, considering that in the new democracies, there is usually no institutionalized party systems and the presidents position themselves above political parties, semi-presidential systems cannot be considered as a good choice. But in this case new democracy decays not because of semi-presidentialism, but due to other institutional factors.
Researchers of presidential and semi-presidential systems claim that the democratic institutions must be the regulators, but not generators of conflict, so they have a negative attitude to the institutional design with nationally elected presidents. Such regime can lead to conflicts and mutual-blocking due to the lack of support for the president in the parliament, and a way out of the dilemma can be unconstitutional. According to Cheybuba, a source of instability is the separation of the executive and legislative authorities that stimulates the conflicts between them. Not only the design, but also other institutional settings (party system, electoral systemnon-simultaneity of elections and so on.) can lead to mutual-blocking. But the use of unconstitutional methods (“top” or “bottom”) solution of the conflict is a consequence not of design of institutes, and the political will of the factors of the conflict and the passive behavior of other veto-players.
Control questions
Questions for discussion